



MOBILISE PROJECT UKRAINE

Nationally Representative Survey May/June 2024

KIISS OMNIBUS

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Survey Methodology

KIIS Omnibus May 2024 Survey Details

1. **Survey Title:** Opinions and Views of the Population of Ukraine: May 2024 (Omnibus)
2. **Survey Period:** May 26, 2024, to June 01, 2024
3. **Sample Size:** 2,011 respondents
4. **Methodology:**
 - **Mode:** Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI)
 - **Sampling:** Mobile phone numbers for all major mobile operators in Ukraine were generated randomly. Non-existing numbers were filtered using an “invisible” SMS message. The interviewers called the generated numbers and invited respondents to participate in the survey.
 - **Population:** Adult Ukrainian citizens aged 18 and older living within Ukraine (excluding AR of Crimea, Sevastopol, and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions not controlled by Ukrainian authorities as of February 24, 2022).
 - **Languages:** Interviews were conducted in Ukrainian or Russian based on the respondent’s preference.
5. **Weighting:** After conducting the interviews, the respondent distribution by macroregion, settlement type, gender, and age was compared with official statistics to ensure representativeness. Statistical weights were computed to align the sample structure with the overall population.
 - a. All data presented below are **weighted to population**.
6. **Margin of Error:**
 - 2.4% for indicators close to 50%
 - 2.1% for indicators close to 25% or 75%
 - 1.5% for indicators close to 10% or 90%
 - 1.1% for indicators close to 5% or 95%
 - 0.5% for indicators close to 1% or 99%
7. <https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/n4zfhbue91xr7vgyzdewm/KIIS-Omnibus-May-2024-Short-survey-information.docx?rlkey=886en22zf85mrtt4ud5ad2irt&dl=0>

Main Survey Results

Key Observations

- a. **Unity among Ukrainians:** There is agreement among Ukrainians about not having elections in wartime. 70% want Zelenskyy to remain president until martial law ends. This means that voters who would not vote for Zelenskyy still see him as a legitimate leader and prefer him to remain as president as opposed to holding wartime elections. This unity is surprising given how polarizing the new mobilization law has been in the country. But this finding does underscore the power of civic unity for stability and relative democratic resilience in Ukraine.
- b. **Lower rates of support for new mobilization law:** The survey results indicate that support for the new mobilization law is relatively low across all regions of Ukraine - with an overall approval rate of only 34%. The highest support is observed in the East (36%) and the lowest in the West (31%). This is likely to make up a new political cleavage.
 - o **Political Impact:** The polarization surrounding the mobilization law has manifested in a clear divide within different regions and demographic groups. This divide is likely to influence future political dynamics and will likely be used discursively in future electoral campaigns, as politicians and parties may need to navigate this contentious issue carefully.
 - o **Reputational Costs:** President Zelenskyy has, in particular, experienced a decline in approval ratings, which can be partly (if not wholly) attributed to the negative reception of the mobilization law. Although his overall approval remains at 56%, the introduction of this law has likely contributed to the erosion of support from certain segments of the population. But it is worthwhile to note that the approval of the parliament even lower and Zelenskyy remains to most popular politician.
 - o **Implications for Governance:** There is polarization over mobilization poses and this will present challenges for governance and will influence policy implementation. The government and opposition parties both need to address the concerns of those opposed to the law while ensuring that necessary measures for national security and defence are effectively communicated and justified to the public. Bi-partisan unity will be essential.

1. Zelenskyy's Continuation as President During Martial Law

Survey Question: Do you fully agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, fully disagree, with the following statement: Zelenskyy should serve as president until the end of martial law? (+ H/S & REF).

Results of those who fully agree and somewhat agree combined:

- Overall Ukraine: 70%
- West: 73%
- Centre: 70%
- South: 74%
- East: 65%

Figure 1

- The chart below shows the percentage of the population that somewhat agrees or strongly agrees with Zelenskyy's continued presidency during martial law across different regions of Ukraine.
- The all national across microregion consistency in support, ranging from 65% to 74%, reflects the widespread approval of Zelenskyy's leadership.




MOBILISE PROJECT

Nationally Representative Surveys 2022-2024 18+ population. Collected by KIIS
N=1,200-2,011 margin of error no greater than 3.3%

OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF UKRAINIANS AGREE ZELENSKYY SHOULD SERVE AS PRESIDENT UNTIL THE END OF MARTIAL LAW

% of population that somewhat agree or strongly agree



MOBILISE Team Analysis: Overwhelming Majority of Ukrainians Agree: Zelenskyy Should Serve as President Until the End of Martial Law

The survey shows a substantial level of agreement across the nation. This data underscores a broad-based approval for President Zelenskyy's continued leadership during the ongoing martial law. The survey results demonstrate a strong consensus among the Ukrainian population in favour of President Zelenskyy continuing to serve until the end of martial law. With a nationwide support of 70%, and regional support ranging from 65% to 74%, it is evident that Ukrainians trust and support Zelenskyy's leadership during this critical period. This broad-based approval underscores the confidence of the Ukrainian people in their president's ability to navigate through the challenges of martial law.

2. Presidential Approval & Voting Preferences in May/June 2024

Survey Question: Some people like the way political leaders act in their positions, others don't. And what about you, do you fully approve, rather approve, rather disapprove, or do not approve of Volodymyr Zelensky as President at all? (Fully Approve, Rather Approve, Rather Disapprove, Fully Disapprove, H/S, REF)

Results: Approval of Zelenskyy (May 2024): 56%

Approval of Volodymyr Zelensky as President

Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully Approve	474	24%	24%	24%
Rather Approve	643	32%	32%	56%
Rather Disapprove	355	18%	18%	73%
Fully Disapprove	374	19%	19%	92%
H/S	143	7%	7%	99%
REF	23	1%	1%	100%
Total	2011	100%	100%	100%

Survey Question: And if elections for president of Ukraine were to take place soon, for whom would you vote, or would you vote for another candidate?

Results Voting Preferences:

- Poroshenko: 7%
- Zaluzhnyi: 27%
- Zelenskyy: 27%




MOBILISE PROJECT

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N=1,200-2,011 margin of error no greater than 3.3%

PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL & WHO UKRAINIANS WOULD VOTE FOR ?

% of the Ukrainian population



- ➡ Fully/somewhat approve of Zelenskyy
- ➡ If elections were held this Sunday I would vote for ... Zelenskyy
- ➡ If elections were held this Sunday I would vote for ... Poroshenko
- ➡ If elections were held this Sunday I would vote for ... Zaluzhnyi

Figure 2

- In the above chart, the black line represents the percentage of the population that fully or somewhat approves of President Zelenskyy.
- The coloured lines represent the voting intentions for Zelenskyy (pink), Poroshenko (blue), and Zaluzhnyi (green).

MOBILISE Team Analysis: Fluctuating Approval Rating for President Zelenskyy Over Time

- **March 2019:** Recent, lower approval ratings are still historically high for any Ukrainian president at the 5 year mark. For instance, Zelenskyy's approval rating was lower right before the 2019 run-off election than it is today, and he won an overwhelming majority in that election.
- **February 2022:** Whilst in early 2022 we saw Zelenskyy's approval rating fall to around 32% this was higher than any predecessor at the same point in the presidency. We also saw a significant increase in approval reflecting heightened support amid escalating geopolitical tensions.
- **September 2023:** The approval rating peaked at around 80% in 2022/2023 by September 2023 it was approximately 77% and showed signs of decline. This suggested the rally around the flag effect was slowing down but there still was strong public endorsement during critical periods of the first two years of war even when the summer 2023 offensive did not provide the results anticipated.
- **May 2024:** Zelenskyy's approval rating fell throughout winter 2023/2024. This fall occurred in tandem with the introduction of new mobilization law. Zelenskyy's approval rating now stands at **56%**, showing a decline but still reflecting substantial support.

The survey also explores the voting intentions of Ukrainians if elections were to be held this Sunday. Respondents were asked, “If elections were held this Sunday, for whom would you vote?”

- **Volodymyr Zelenskyy:**
 - **March 2019:** Initial voting intention was low but saw a significant rise over the years.
 - **February 2022:** Voting intention peaked, reflecting increased confidence in Zelenskyy’s leadership during challenging times as a direct result of a rally around the flag effect.
 - **September 2023:** The intention to vote for Zelenskyy remained high even after nearly two years of all-out war and a slow battlefield development. Until winter 2023/2024 no politician came close to being competitive with the incumbent in polls.
 - **May 2024:** **27%** of respondents expressed their intention to vote for Zelenskyy, showing a notable decline from previous peaks. Modelling would suggest that Zelensky would still win any election should it occur.
- **Petro Poroshenko:**
 - Consistently lower voting intention, maintaining around **7%** across different survey periods, indicating stable but minor support. Poroshenko is unlikely to be competitive in a future presidential race.
- **Valerii Zaluzhnyi:**
 - Emerging as a significant contender in the later stages of our war-time surveying, reaching **27%** in May 2024, equalling Zelenskyy’s current voting intention. But there are potential drawbacks of a military commander potentially running for President as it would alter the clear division between and control of the military by the democratically elected civilian government – an essential for democratic resilience.

The survey results demonstrate significant fluctuations in both presidential approval and voting intentions. President Zelenskyy’s approval rating and voting intention saw substantial peaks, particularly during critical periods, but have shown a slight decline as of May 2024. Meanwhile, Valerii Zaluzhnyi has emerged as a strong contender, matching Zelenskyy’s voting intention. Petro Poroshenko’s support remains consistent but relatively low. These findings reflect the dynamic political sentiment in Ukraine, shaped by ongoing events and public perception of leadership effectiveness.

3. Attitudes Towards Zelenskyy

Survey Question: Which of the following words best describes your attitude towards Zelenskyy?

Respondents were given options ranging from positive sentiments like “Enthusiasm” and “Sympathy” to more negative feelings such as “Antipathy” and “Disgust.” Neutral and mixed feelings were also captured with options like “Neutral, indifferent” and “I can’t say anything bad about him.” The results across four time periods (July 2022, February 2023, September 2023, and May 2024) show significant changes in public sentiment.

Which of the following words best describes your attitude towards Zelenskyy?

	Jul-22	Feb-23	Sep-23	May-24
Enthusiasm	33%	37%	18%	8%
Sympathy	18%	13%	18%	18%
I can’t say anything bad about him	32%	34%	36%	29%
Neutral, indifferent	6%	6%	9%	14%
Vigilant, expectant	5%	4%	7%	7%
I can’t say anything good about him	2%	2%	4%	8%
Antipathy	1%	1%	2%	5%
Disgust	1%	1%	3%	5%
H/S (Hard to Say)	2%	2%	2%	4%
REF (Refused to Answer)	0%	0%	1%	0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%



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WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING WORDS BEST DESCRIBES YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS ZELENSKYY?

% of the Ukrainian population




Figure 3: The above chart illustrates a significant shift in public sentiment towards President Zelenskyy over the two-year period:

- **Decline in Enthusiasm:** The percentage of respondents expressing “Enthusiasm” for Zelensky has seen a sharp decline from 33% in July 2022 to just 8% in May 2024. This suggests a significant drop in strong positive feelings towards the President.
- **Stable Sympathy:** The “Sympathy” category has remained relatively stable over the time periods, with a slight increase in May 2024 compared to February 2023 and September 2023.
- **Mixed Sentiments:** The category “I can’t say anything bad about him” has **consistently been one of the highest responses**, indicating that a significant portion of the population maintains a generally positive view of Zelensky without strong enthusiasm.
- **Increase in Neutral/Indifferent and Negative Sentiments:** There has been an increase in the percentages of “Neutral, indifferent”, “I can’t say anything good about him”, “Antipathy”, and “Disgust” categories, especially noticeable in May 2024. This suggests growing ambivalence and negative sentiments towards Zelensky over time.
- **Hard to Say Responses:** The “Hard to Say” responses have also increased, indicating a growing uncertainty or ambivalence among the population regarding their view of Zelensky.

MOBILISE Team Analysis: Significant Changes in Public Sentiment Toward Zelenskyy

The survey results illustrate a comprehensive view of how public sentiment has shifted over this period. The survey results highlight a marked decline in positive sentiment towards President Zelenskyy, with enthusiasm for his leadership dropping sharply. Mixed and neutral sentiments have increased, indicating a more cautious or indifferent public stance. Negative sentiments have also risen, reflecting growing dissatisfaction among some segments of the population. These trends underscore the dynamic nature of public opinion and the various factors influencing attitudes towards political leadership in Ukraine.

4. Opinions on Negotiations and Referendum

Survey Question: Do you fully agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, fully disagree with the following statement: The Ukrainian government should not make any compromises in negotiations. Ukraine will continue fighting as long as it takes.

Results:

- Negotiations to Referendum (May 2024): 65%

The Ukrainian government should not make any compromises in negotiations.
Ukraine will continue fighting as long as it takes

Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Completely agree	750	37	37	37
Somewhat agree	421	21	21	58
Somewhat disagree	308	15	15	74
Completely disagree	301	15	15	89
HARD TO SAY	216	11	11	99
REF	14	1	1	100
Total	2,011	100	100	

Survey Question: Do you fully agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, fully disagree, with the following statement: Any negotiations result between Ukraine and Russia should be put to a referendum. The Ukrainian people should decide.

Results:

- No Compromise (May 2024): 58%

Any negotiations result between Ukraine and Russia should be put to a referendum.

Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Completely agree	783	39	39	39
Somewhat agree	528	26	26	65
Somewhat disagree	198	10	10	75
Completely disagree	298	15	15	90
HARD TO SAY	191	10	10	99
REF	13	1	1	100
Total	2,011	100	100	




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MOBILISE PROJECT

MAJORITY OF UKRAINIANS AGREE THAT GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT COMPROMISE & WANT TO SEE A REFERENDUM ON ANY NEGOTIATIONS

% of the Ukrainian population that somewhat agree or strongly agree



Any negotiations results between Ukraine and Russia should be put to a referendum. The Ukrainian people should decide.

Ukrainian government should not make any compromises in negotiations. Ukraine will continue fighting as long as it takes.

Figure 4: Negotiations, Compromise, and Referendum Preferences

- The pink line represents the percentage of respondents who agree that the government should not make any compromises in negotiations. The consistent decline from 80% in May 2022 to 58% in May 2024 suggests a gradual, albeit significant, decrease in unwavering support over time.
- The blue line shows the percentage of respondents who believe that negotiation results should be put to a referendum. This line remains relatively stable, starting at 70% in May 2022 and slightly decreasing to 65% in May 2024, indicating sustained support for direct public involvement in decision-making.

MOBILISE Team Analysis: Majority of Ukrainians Support Non-Compromise Stance and Referendum on Negotiations

The May 2024 survey reveals significant insights into the attitudes of the Ukrainian population towards governmental negotiations with Russia. The findings indicate a strong preference among Ukrainians for their government to maintain a firm stance without making compromises, and for any negotiation results to be subjected to a public referendum.

Figure 5: Support for Non-Compromise in Negotiations

The survey highlights a clear sentiment among the respondents.

- **37% of respondents completely agree** with the statement.
- **21% somewhat agree**, bringing the **total agreement** to 58%.
- Meanwhile, **15% somewhat disagree**, and another **15% completely disagree**, indicating a minority opposition.
- **11% were uncertain (HARD TO SAY)**, and **1% refused to answer (REF)**.

This distribution underscores that a significant majority (58%) supports a non-compromise approach, reflecting the population's resilience and determination in the face of ongoing conflict.

In Figure 5 the data is broken down into four regional categories:

1. **All Ukraine:** 58% of the population somewhat or strongly agree that the government should not compromise.
2. **West:** 63% of respondents in the western region hold this view.
3. **Centre:** 59% of people in the central region agree with the sentiment.
4. **East:** 55% of those surveyed in the eastern region believe the government should not compromise.

This highlights a general consensus across different regions, with a notable higher agreement in the western and central parts of the country.



MOBILISE PROJECT

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UKRAINIANS WHO AGREE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT COMPROMISE

% of the population that somewhat agree or strongly agree




Figure 6: Preference for a Referendum on Negotiation Results

A parallel question asked, “Do you fully agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or fully disagree with the following statement: ‘Any negotiations result between Ukraine and Russia should be put to a referendum. The Ukrainian people should decide.’”

- Here, **39% completely agree** and **26% somewhat agree**, totalling **65%** who favour a referendum.
- On the contrary, **10% somewhat disagree**, and **15% completely disagree** with the idea of a referendum.
- Additionally, **10% were unsure**, and **1% refused to answer**.

This preference for a referendum indicates a strong desire among Ukrainians for direct democratic involvement in critical national decisions, reinforcing the population’s commitment to democratic principles even during tumultuous times.

In Figure 6, the data is broken down into four regional categories:

1. **All Ukraine:** 65% of the population somewhat or strongly agree that any negotiations should be put to a referendum.
2. **West:** 66% of respondents in the western region hold this view.
3. **Centre:** 66% of people in the central region agree with the sentiment.
4. **East:** 64% of those surveyed in the eastern region believe that any negotiations should be put to a referendum.

This indicates a widespread agreement across different regions that any significant negotiations should be decided through a referendum, with slightly higher agreement in the central and western parts of the country.

The survey results clearly reflect a robust sentiment among Ukrainians for maintaining a non-compromising stance in negotiations with Russia and for involving the public through referendums on any negotiation outcomes. These findings highlight the population’s enduring resilience and democratic values amidst ongoing conflict, emphasizing their desire for active participation in shaping the nation’s future.




MOBILISE PROJECT

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UKRAINIANS WHO AGREE ANY NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE PUT TO A REFERENDUM

% of the population that somewhat agree or strongly agree



5. Support for New Mobilization Law

Survey Question: Do you fully agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, fully disagree, statement: I support the new mobilisation law.

Results:

- Overall Ukraine: 34%
- West: 31%
- Centre: 35%
- South: 34%
- East: 36%

"I support the new mobilisation law."

Responses	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Completely agree	296	15%	15%	15%
Somewhat agree	389	19%	19%	34%
Somewhat disagree	410	20%	20%	54%
Completely disagree	635	32%	32%	86%
HARD TO SAY	257	13%	13%	99%
REF	25	1%	1%	100%
Total	2011	100%	100%	100%



MOBILISE PROJECT
Nationally Representative Survey May 2024 18+ population. Collected by KIIS
N=2,011 margin of error no greater than 3.3%

1/3 SUPPORT THE NEW MOBILISATION LAW

% of population that somewhat agree or strongly agree with “ I support the new mobilisation law”




Figure 7

- The chart above shows the percentage of the population that somewhat agrees or strongly agrees with the new mobilisation law across different regions of Ukraine.
- The consistency in support, ranging from 31% to 36%, underscores the moderate backing for the law nationwide.

MOBILISE Team Analysis:

One-Third of Ukrainians Support the New Mobilisation Law

The survey reveals the level of agreement among the respondents.

- **34% of respondents nationwide** support the new mobilisation law.
- The support is fairly consistent across different regions, with **31% in the West, 35% in the Centre, 34% in the South, and 36% in the East.**

This data indicates a moderate level of support across the country, suggesting a balanced view towards the new mobilisation law among the Ukrainian population.

Regional Variations


While the overall support for the new mobilisation law is 34%, there are slight regional differences:

- **Western Ukraine** shows a slightly lower support at **31%**.
- **Central Ukraine** has the highest support at **35%**.
- **Southern Ukraine** aligns with the national average at **34%**.
- **Eastern Ukraine** shows the highest support among the regions at **36%**.
-

These regional variations highlight the nuanced perspectives within the country, with the Centre and East showing relatively higher levels of support compared to the West.

Regression Analysis

We include the results of an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis employing a model predicting opposition to mobilization based on several independent variables.



Model Summary:

- Number of observations: 2,011
- R-squared: 0.1753, indicating that approximately 17.53% of the variability in opposition to mobilization is explained by the model.
- F-statistic: 32.94, p-value < 0.0001, suggesting that the model is statistically significant overall.

Interpretation:

- **Age:** For each additional year of age, opposition to mobilization decreases by 0.6 percentage point on average, holding all other variables constant. This effect is statistically significant.
- **Woman:** Being a woman is associated with a 9-percentage point increase in the likelihood of opposition to mobilization, on average, compared to men, holding other variables constant. This effect is statistically significant.
- **East:** Living in the East of Ukraine has a small, non-significant negative association with opposition to mobilization.
- **West:** Living in the West of Ukraine is associated with a 6-percentage point increase in the likelihood of opposition to mobilization, although this result is marginally significant.
- **South:** Living in the South of Ukraine has a small, non-significant positive association with opposition to mobilization.
- **Education:** Higher education levels are associated with a small, non-significant decrease in opposition to mobilization.
- **Family Financial Situation:** Better family financial situation is associated with a small, non-significant decrease in opposition to mobilization.
- **Nationality:** Identifying as Ukrainian has a small, non-significant positive association with opposition to mobilization.
- **Survey Language:** Responding to the survey in Ukrainian (*language practice* as per Onuch and Hale 2018) is associated with a 12-percentage point decrease in the likelihood of opposition to mobilization, which is statistically significant.
- **No Compromise:** Believing that no compromises should be made in any future negotiations is associated with a 19-percentage point decrease in the likelihood of opposition to mobilization, which is statistically significant. Ukrainians who are more hardline on the no-compromise position are less likely to oppose mobilization.
- **Approval of Zelensky:** Approving of President Zelensky is associated with a 24-percentage point decrease in the likelihood of opposition to mobilization, which is statistically significant. Thus, those who have a high approval of Zelensky also approve of mobilization. Like these two factors are not only highly correlated but also potentially endogenous.

Our regression analysis indicates that several factors significantly influence opposition to mobilization. Age, being a woman, language of the survey, stance on no compromise, and approval of Zelensky all have significant impacts. Older individuals, those who speak Ukrainian, those who support no compromises, and those who approve of Zelensky are less likely to oppose mobilization. Women are more likely to oppose mobilization than men.

Other factors, such as region of residence, education, family financial situation, and nationality, do not show significant effects in this model. The overall model explains about 17.53% of the variance in opposition to mobilization, indicating that other unmeasured factors also play a role.

Polarization Over Mobilization

The introduction of the new mobilization law in Ukraine has emerged as a highly polarizing issue, creating a significant political cleavage within society. Despite the law being initiated and requested by military and political actors, including the parliament and the president, its announcement has resulted in substantial reputational and approval costs for the political figures, government, parliament and president.

MOBILISE Project Overview

1. **Project Title:** Determinants of 'Mobilisation' at Home & Abroad
2. **Funding:** This research was in part funded by the Open Research Area funded MOBILISE project (www.mobiliseproject.com) Grant Ref ESRC ES/S015213/1. The 2024 data were collected by the French team.
3. **Survey Objectives:** The MOBILISE Project aims to understand the determinants of 'mobilisation' at home and abroad through a multi-wave, nationally representative panel survey. The survey collects data on citizens' attitudes towards protests, migration, political engagement, and sociopolitical factors. This project spans four countries: Ukraine, Poland, Argentina, and Morocco. Thus, the primary aim of the MOBILISE survey is to collect information on citizens' attitudes towards and personal experiences of protest and migration, along with other political, sociological, and demographic factors. This survey series also provides insights into shifts in attitudes over time, especially in the context of ongoing war in Ukraine.

General MOBILISE Project Methodology

Questionnaire: The questionnaire was designed by the MOBILISE Project PIs/CoIs and reviewed by an external Expert Advisory Board. It includes five sections:

1. Media Consumption
2. Political dispositions and engagement
3. Migration experience and intention
4. Other issue positions, policy preferences, and item opinions
5. Demographics

The questionnaire also includes questions related to the ongoing war (in the context of Ukraine) and several pre-registered experiments to assess various sociopolitical attitudes.

Temporal Scope of Main Panel: The main panel surveys were conducted in four different waves:

- **Wave 1:** March-April 2019 for Ukraine.
- **Wave 2:** October 2020 – April 2021 for Ukraine.
- **Wave 3:** December 2021 – February 2022 for Ukraine.
- **Wave 4:** 11th September 2023 - 29th September 2023 for Ukraine.

Sampling Procedure The sampling design includes a three-stage stratified random sampling approach:

1. **First Stage:** Stratification by regions (e.g., oblasts in Ukraine).
2. **Second Stage:** Differentiation between urban and rural populations.
3. **Third Stage:** Selection of voting precincts proportional to the adult population.

In Ukraine, the sample includes all regions controlled by the Ukrainian government, excluding Crimea and occupied territories. The sample is representative of the 18+ population with mobile phones, excluding those serving in the army, imprisoned, or in medical facilities.

Data Collection Mode The survey employs different modes depending on the wave:

- **Wave 1:** CAPI (Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing) for face-to-face interviews.
- **Wave 2:** CAPI and CATI (Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing) for face-to-face and phone interviews.
- **Wave 3:** CATI for phone interviews due to COVID-19 and other logistical reasons.

- **Wave 4:** CATI for phone interviews as per the ongoing conditions.

Weights: Weights were applied to correct for overrepresentation of certain demographics (e.g., older individuals and urban residents). Probability weights were estimated to correct for the overrepresentation of men, older individuals, and urban residents.

Response Rates and Representativeness

- **Wave 1 Ukraine:** Complete Interviews - 2011; Response Rate - 52%.
- **Wave 2 Ukraine:** Complete Interviews - 1450; Response Rate - 60%.
- **Wave 3 Ukraine:** Complete Interviews - 1218; Response Rate for new entries - 12.1%, for panel participants - 55%.
- **Wave 4 Ukraine:** Complete Interviews - 2025; Response Rate for new entries - 10.1%, for panel participants - 14.6%.

The samples are representative of the respective 18+ permanent residents, excluding certain groups as mentioned above.

General Overview of MOBILSIE KIIS Omnibus Surveys

The MOBILISE project included a battery of 15-25 questions in three nationwide Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) OMNIBUS surveys conducted in Ukraine, spanning from July 2022 to May 2024. These surveys aimed to capture the opinions and views of the adult population (aged 18 and older) on various socio-political and socio-economic issues. The surveys were conducted using the computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) method, which involved randomly generating mobile phone numbers for all major mobile operators in Ukraine and subsequently contacting respondents for interviews.

MOBILSIE KIIS Omnibus Survey Methodology

Sampling and Data Collection

- **Sample Size:** Each survey targeted approximately 2000 respondents.
- **Geographic Coverage:** The surveys covered all regions of Ukraine except for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and regions temporarily not controlled by Ukrainian authorities until February 24, 2022 (some districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions).
- **Language:** Interviews were conducted in Ukrainian or Russian, based on respondent preference.
- **Exclusion:** The surveys did not include citizens who had gone abroad after February 24, 2022.

Sampling Method

- **Random Generation of Numbers:** Mobile phone numbers were generated randomly, with proportional representation for each mobile operator.
- **Verification:** An “invisible” SMS message was sent to verify the existence of generated numbers.
- **Interview Invitations:** Interviewers called the verified numbers and invited respondents to participate in the survey.

Weighting and Adjustment

- **Post-Survey Adjustment:** After data collection, the sample distribution was compared with official statistics on macroregions, settlement types, gender, and age to ensure representativeness. Special statistical weights were applied to align the sample structure with the overall population structure of Ukraine.

Detailed Survey Information

1. July 2022 Survey

- **Field Stage:** July 06 to July 18, 2022
- **Sample Size:** 2000 respondents
- **Margin of Error:**
 - $\pm 2.4\%$ for indicators close to 50%
 - $\pm 2.1\%$ for indicators close to 25% or 75%
 - $\pm 1.5\%$ for indicators close to 10% or 90%
 - $\pm 1.1\%$ for indicators close to 5% or 95%
 - $\pm 0.5\%$ for indicators close to 1% or 99%

2. February 2023 Survey

- **Field Stage:** February 22 to March 06, 2023
- **Sample Size:** 2007 respondents
- **Margin of Error:**
 - $\pm 2.4\%$ for indicators close to 50%
 - $\pm 2.1\%$ for indicators close to 25% or 75%
 - $\pm 1.5\%$ for indicators close to 10% or 90%
 - $\pm 1.1\%$ for indicators close to 5% or 95%

- $\pm 0.5\%$ for indicators close to 1% or 99%

3. May 2024 Survey

- **Field Stage:** May 26 to June 01, 2024
- **Sample Size:** 2011 respondents
- **Margin of Error:**
 - $\pm 2.4\%$ for indicators close to 50%
 - $\pm 2.1\%$ for indicators close to 25% or 75%
 - $\pm 1.5\%$ for indicators close to 10% or 90%
 - $\pm 1.1\%$ for indicators close to 5% or 95%
 - $\pm 0.5\%$ for indicators close to 1% or 99%